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Civil Rights in the Academy
The Constitution and Racial Preference
in Law School Admissions
By Robert A. Sedler
ne of the consequences of the
civil rights movement of the
1960s was the demand by Af-
rican-Americans and other ra-
cial minorities that they be
able to participate equally with whites in
the legal profession, where racial minorities
were seriously underrepresented. 1 The law
schools responded to this demand by adopt-
ing racially preferential admission policies
under which qualified minority applicants
would be admitted with lower grades and
LSAT scores than white applicants. These
policies continue in effect today.
Racially preferential law school admis-
sion policies have substantially increased
the representation of racial minorities in the
legal profession, both in terms of percent-
age and in terms of absolute numbers. Mi-
nority lawyers serve as judges, prosecutors
and law professors. They are lawyers for the
government, "members of the firm," and bar
association officers. They are in a position
to contribute directly to the American legal
system, to make that system responsive to
the needs of minority persons, and to build
the confidence of minority persons in the
legal system and in the administration of
justice precisely because minority lawyers
are part of that system.
This increase in the representation of
racial minorities in the legal profession has,
however, been accomplished at the cost of
denying admission to some white appli-
cants at particular law schools because of
their race. These are the nonadmitted white
applicants who have higher grades and
LSAT scores than a number of the admit-
ted minority applicants. These nonadmit-
ted white applicants may properly claim
that they have been the victims of racial dis-
crimination 2 and for this reason the racially
preferential admission policies of public
universities are subject to constitutional
challenge under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's equal protection clause.3
Racially preferential law
school admission policies
have substantially increased
the representation of racial
minorities in the legal
profession, both in terms of
percentage and in terms of
absolute numbers.
The Supreme Court considered such a
challenge to the racially preferential admis-
sion policies of a public university medical
school in Bakke v Regents of the University
of California,4 where the school reserved 16
of the 100 places in the entering class for
minority applicants. In Bakke, four justices,
Stevens, Burger, Rehnquist and Stewart, in
an opinion by Justice Stevens, avoided the
constitutional question and took the posi-
tion that the use of any racial preference in
university admissions was prohibited by
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 19645
Four other justices, Brennan, White,
Marshall and Blackmun, took the position
that overcoming the present consequences
of past societal discrimination-reflected
both in the underrepresentation of minority
physicians and the generally lower grades
and test scores of minority applicants-was
a compelling governmental interest, and
that the use of a reasonable racial quota was
a constitutionally permissible means of ad-
vancing that interest. 6Jeustice Powell cast the deciding vote.
Disagreeing with the "Brennan four" on
this point, he insisted that overcoming
he present consequences of past societal
discrimination was not a compelling gov-
ernmental interest justifying the use of
race-conscious admissions policies.7 How-
ever, according to Justice Powell, the uni-
versity's interest in achieving a racially di-
verse student body was a compelling
governmental interest, justifying the use
of precisely tailored race-conscious admis-
sions criteria.
He went on to say that a racial quota was
a constitutionally impermissible means of
advancing this interest, since it would "hin-
der rather than further attainment of gen-
uine diversity." Rather, the university could
take race into account as a "single but im-
portant factor" in admissions and could give
"competitive consideration to race and eth-
nic origin." The university could also "pay
some attention to the numbers" to ensure
that in a given year a reasonable number
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of minority students would be enrolled.8
The Brennan opinion reluctantly agreed
with Powell's educational diversity position
in a footnote.
Since five justices in effect agreed that
educational diversity was a compelling gov-
ernmental interest, justifying at least some
consideration of race in the admissions
process, there was a holding on that issue
in Bakke. Where there is a Court majority
on the point in issue, but no majority opin-
ion, the Court's holding on that issue is
based on the "narrowest ground of agree-
ment of those members of the Court who
concurred in the judgment."10 Since the cir-
cumstances in which Justice Powell would
find the use of race-conscious admissions
criteria constitutionally permissible are nar-
rower than those in which the Brennan
four would find it permissible, the Powell
opinion sets forth the holding of the Court
on this issue, even though no other jus-
tice joined in it.
Following Bakke, public universities
revised their race-conscious admissions
programs in accordance with what they
thought would comply with Justice Powell's
competitive consideration of race and eth-
nic origin approach and justified the pro-
grams as advancing what was now rec-
ognized as the universities' compelling
governmental interest in attaining educa-
tional diversity.11
s stated previously, the primary
purpose for the adoption of racially
preferential law school admissions
programs was not attaining educational
diversity, but increasing the underrepre-
sentation of racial minorities in the legal
profession and in this sense "diversify-
ing" the legal profession. Nonetheless,
since these programs do succeed in
bringing about educational diversity in
the law schools, their continued exis-
tence can be justified on this basis, and
it is not necessary for constitutional pur-
poses that the law schools demonstrate
that the interest in increasing minority
representation in the legal profession is
compelling as well. And it cannot be
doubted that a racially diverse student
body (and faculty) does make a positive
contribution to the educational experi-
ence of all law students. 2
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... if racial preference were eliminated entirely,
the minority students with the credential levels
that now enable them to be admitted
at "elite" and middle-ranked law schools would
be admitted to some other law schools.
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In a series of cases after Bakke, how-
ever, the Supreme Court has generally in-
validated the government's use of racial
preference in contexts other than univer-
sity admissions. In these cases, the Court
has held that the government's use of racial
preference was constitutionally impermis-
sible unless it was remedial, and there was
a "substantial basis in evidence" for con-
cluding that the particular use of racial
preference was necessary to eliminate the
present consequences of identified past
racial discrimination for which the gov-
ernment itself was responsible.13
he most recent cases coming before
the Court indicate that the Court, al-
though divided on this question, is
reluctant to uphold any form of racial pref-
erence or use of race-conscious criteria ex-
cept for this remedial purpose.' 4
In reliance on these cases, in Hopwood
v State of Texas,15 the Fifth Circuit held
that the University of Texas law school's
preferential admissions program for
African-Americans and Mexican-Ameri-
cans violated equal protection. 16 Two of
the judges took the position that educa-
tional diversity was not a compelling gov-
ernmental interest justifying the use of
race-conscious admissions criteria. They
said that the educational diversity ration-
ale of Powell's opinion in Bakke did not
represent a Court holding on that issue, 17
and that the subsequent Supreme Court
cases had made it clear that the only com-
pelling governmental interest justifying the
use of race-conscious criteria was the re-
medial interest of overcoming the present
consequences of identified past discrimi-
nation for which the government itself was
responsible.'S
Robert A. Sedler is a pro-
fessor of law at Wayne
State University. He has
written extensively in the
area of racial preference
and the Constitution and
is a strong proponent of
racial preference as a
means of bringing about
the equal participation of
racial minorities in the legal profession and in all
other important areas of American life. He is the
chair of the Admissions Committee at Wayne State
University Law School and has long been involved
in efforts to increase minority representation in the
law school student body.
The third judge assumed arguendo that
educational diversity could be a compelling
governmental interest, but found that the
law school's admissions program was un-
constitutional because it was not narrowly
tailored to achieve diversity.19 The U.S. Su-
preme Court denied the university's peti-
tion for certiorari. Justices Ginsburg and
Souter concurred separately in the denial
of the petition, pointing out that the law
school's 1992 admissions program that had
been invalidated in Hopwood had long
since been discontinued and was not now
being defended by the university. Accord-
ing to these justices, "we must await a final
judgment on a program genuinely in con-
troversy before addressing the important
question raised in this petition."20
Where does the result in Hopwood leave
the constitutionality of racial preference in
law school admissions today? In the three
states comprising the Fifth Circuit, Texas,
Louisiana and Mississippi, any use of racial
preference in law school admissions will be
found unconstitutional in a federal court
challenge under Hopwood. In other states,
the matter remains unsettled. Hopwood may
spark a spate of constitutional challenges to
racially preferential admissions programs
by rejected white applicants.2' It may be
that the first decision on the question by a
federal court of appeals or the highest state
court will be reviewed by the Supreme
Court. Or the Supreme Court may decide
to wait until there are conflicting decisions.
In any event, it will be some time before
the matter is definitively resolved by the
Supreme Court.
When the case does come before the
Court, the Court will squarely decide
whether educational diversity is a com-
pelling governmental interest, justifying
the use of race-conscious admissions cri-
teria. The Court may also decide whether
or not increasing minority representation
in the legal profession is a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. If the Court holds that
diversity and/or increasing minority repre-
sentation in the legal profession is a com-
pelling governmental interest, it will then
have to decide what are the constitutionally
permissible means by which a university
may employ racial considerations in the ad-
missions process.
In so doing, the Court obviously will not
be constrained by the "competitive consid-
eration of race or ethnic origin" approach of
Powell's Bakke opinion. The Court might
decide to approve any use of race-conscious
criteria, such as a reasonable racial quota,
that does not unnecessarily trammel the
interests of rejected white applicants 2 Or
it may impose very restrictive and specific
constitutional guidelines for the permissible
use of race-conscious admissions criteria.In the cases coming before the lower
courts in the interim, the constitutional
question is quite different. The courts
will have to decide whether, in light of
Bakke and subsequent Supreme Court de-
cisions, educational diversity continues to
constitute a compelling governmental in-
terest justifying the use of race-conscious
admissions criteria. If the court concludes
that it does constitute a compelling gov-
ernmental interest, it will then have to de-
cide whether the particular racially pref-
erential admissions program is precisely
tailored to advance that interest.
The result will not only depend on the
particular facts, but on how the court in-
terprets the competitive consideration of
race or ethnic origin approach of Powell's
Bakke opinion, and on whether the court
concludes that this is the only constitution-
ally permissible means of advancing the law
school's interest in educational diversity.
In the final analysis, however, I do not
think that the constitutional invalidation of
racially preferential law school admissions
programs, should this occur, will have a
significant impact on the overall admission
of racial minorities to law schools and thus
on increased minority representation in the
legal profession. This is so for two reasons.
As an initial matter, if racial preference
were eliminated entirely, the minority stu-
dents with the credential levels that now
enable them to be admitted at "elite" and
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... it does not appear that the Court's invalidation
of racially preferential law school admissions
policies, if it should do so, would in practice
have much effect on the enrollment
of minority students at most law schools.
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middle-ranked law schools would be ad-
mitted to some other law schools. In this
sense, the elimination of racial preference
would probably not have much effect on
the efforts to increase minority representa-
tion in the legal profession. It would only
mean that fewer minority lawyers would
come from higher-ranked schools.
ut there is a second, and probably
more significant, consideration. Those
who are opposed to the use of racial
preference, in law school admissions and
otherwise, generally are not opposed to
and may even strongly favor the equal par-
ticipation of racial minorities in the legal
profession and in other important areas of
American life. Their objection is to the use
of racial preference to bring about this re-
sult. What stands out most strikingly in the
debate over racial preference in the courts
and elsewhere is the insistence of oppo-
nents of racial preference that the equal
participation of racial minorities in the ac-
tivity in question can be accomplished by
racially neutral means. Indeed, the "golden
mean" appears to be the accomplishment
of the racial result by the use of racially
neutral means. This can be done, it is said,
by the consideration of factors that "corre-
late with race."
In Hopwood, the Fifth Circuit was care-
ful to emphasize that the university could
consider "a host of factors--some of which
may have some correlation with race-in
making admissions decisions, such as the
economic or educational background of
one's parents."23 When Bakke was before
the California Supreme Court, that Court
said that since racial minorities were dis-
proportionately economically disadvan-
taged in comparison with whites, the uni-
versity could bring about the admission
of minority students by giving preference
to economically disadvantaged students of
all races.24
And in City of Richmond v J A Croson
Co,25 Justices O'Connor and Scalia, who
were part of the Court majority that struck
down a minority business set-aside pro-
gram, emphasized that a constitutionally
permissible set-aside for economically dis-
advantaged businesses would dispropor-
tionately benefit racial minorities.
There is no doubt that if the Supreme
Court holds that racially preferential law
school admissions policies are unconsti-
tutional, the law schools will adopt in their
place policies that consider factors that
"may have some correlation with race," such
as economic disadvantage or geographic lo-
cation. So long as these factors are adminis-
tered in a racially neutral manner and re-
sult in the preferential admission of whites
as well as minority persons, they are likely
to withstand constitutional challenge.26
... a racially diverse
student body (and faculty)
does make a positive
contribution to the
educational experience
of all law students.
Therefore, it does not appear that the
Court's invalidation of racially preferential
law school admissions policies, if it should
do so, would in practice have much effect
on the enrollment of minority students at
most law schools. With or without racially
preferential law school admissions policies,
minority students will continue to enroll
in law schools, and minority representa-
tion in the legal profession will continue
to increase. U
Footnotes
1. The data showing underrepresentation of
minority lawyers at that time is discussed
in Sedler, "Racial Preference, Reality and the
Constitution: Bakke v Regents of the Univer-
sity of California," 17 Santa Clara L Rev 329,
346-47, ns. 65-71 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as "Bakke"].
2. The discrimination seems particularly un-
fair when the minority students who re-
ceive the preference have come from the
same advantaged backgrounds as the non-
admitted white students. However, any
form of preference in university admissions
that is not based on purely academic factors
(such as athletic ability) is also unfair. The
policy question, as well as the constitu-
tional one, depends not only on fairness
but on justification. I submit that racial
preference designed to bring about the full
and equal participation of racial minorities
in the legal profession and in all important
aspects of American life may be unfair, but
it is not unjustifiable. See generally the dis-
cussion in Sedler, The Constitution, Racial
Preference, and the Equal Participation Ob-
jective 123, 139, n. 17, in Slavery and Its Con-
sequences; The Constitution, Equality and
Race (Goldwin & Kaufman, eds. 1988)
[hereinafter cited as "Racial Preference"].
3. The explicit use of race in the admission
policies of private universities receiving
federal funds, as virtually all private uni-
versities do, would render those policies
subject to challenge as constituting "dis-
crimination on the basis of race" under Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See n.5,
infra and accompanying text.
4. 438 US 265 (1978).
5. 438 US at 411-21.
6. 438 US at 362-79.
7. 438 US at 310. Justice Powell did, however,
acknowledge that the government would
have a compelling interest in overcoming
the present consequences of its own iden-
tified past discrimination.
8. 326 US at 316-19.
9. See 438 US at 326, n 1.
10. Marks v United States, 430 US 188, 193
(1977).
11. See Lesnick, "What Does Bakke Require of
Law Schools?" 128 U Pa L Rev 141 (1979).
12. In his opinion in Bakke, Justice Powell re-
ferred to the Harvard College admission
program, which states simply that a "black
student can usually bring something that
a white person cannot offer." 438 US at 316.
That "something" is the perspective that
comes from the experience of being black
in America. In the educational context, that
experience can be shared with white stu-
dents, so that black and white students, in-
teracting with one another, can "contribute
to the robust exchange of ideas." Id. at 313.
13. See Richmond v J A Croson Co, 488 US 469
(1989) (minority business set-aside pro-
gram); Wygant v Jackson Board of Educa-
tion, 476 US 267 (1986) (out-of-line senior-
ity layoff of teachers in order to preserve
racial hiring gains).
14. In Adarand Constructors, Inc v Pena, 115 S Ct
2097 (1995), the Court held that the use
of racial preference by the federal govern-
ment is subject to the same "strict scrutiny"
standard as its use by state and local gov-
ernments. In so doing, the Court overruled
Metro Broadcasting, Inc v FCC (1990), where
the Court applied an intermediate standard
of review to the use of racial preference by
the federal government and on this basis
upheld a minority preference program for
the issuance of broadcast licenses that was
justified as promoting "broadcasting diver-
sity." The Adarand holding also may have
called into question the Court's approach of
giving some deference to congressional find-
ings of identified past discrimination in
Fullilove v Klutznick, 448 US 448 (1980).
15. 78 F3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
16. Under this program the law school sought
to achieve an entering class consisting of
approximately 10 percent Mexican-Ameri-
cans and five percent African-Americans,
proportions roughly comparable to the per-
centages of these races graduating from
Texas colleges. In order to achieve this goal
the applications of African-Americans and
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Pro Bono HONOR ROLL
In January, 1991, former State Bar President James K. Robinson encouraged law
firms, corporations and organizations to endorse the voluntary State Bar Pro
Bono Standard adopted by the Representative Assembly, and to adopt written
Pro Bono policies for their lawyers. Listed below are the names of those finns, cor-
porations and organizations which have both adopted such policies and advised
that their attorneys are making a good faith effort to comply with the Standard.
The Pro Bono Involvement Committee salutes these firms, corporations and
organizations for their important public service efforts.
Firms
AlexJ. Miller
Barris, Sott, Denn & Driker
Bator, Roualet & Berlin, PC.
Benson McCurdy & Wotila, PC.
Blaske & Blaske, PC.
Bodman, Longley & Dahling
Bos & Glazier
Brinks & Associates
Butzel Long
Charles P Reisman
Clark Hill, PL.C.
Daniel L. Kraft
David E. Bulson, PC.
David B. Herrington
Dickinson, Wright, Moon, Van Dusen
& Freeman
Dunnings and Frawley, PC.
Dykema Gossett
Flanigan, Traver, Emerson & Lepley
Foster, Swift, Collins & Smith, PC.
Francine Cullari
Freeman McKenzie, PC.
Grant W Parsons, P.C.
Honigman Miller Schwartz
and Cohn
J. Thomas Carroll, Jr, PC.
John B. Payne, Jr
Josephson & Fink
Kerr, Russell and Weber
Kreis, Enderle, Callander
& Hudgins, PC.
Law, Weathers & Richardson, PC.
LeonJ. Weiss
Marietta S. Robinson
Michelle L. Gullet
Miller, Johnson, Snell & Cummiskey
Morganroth, Morganroth, Alexander
& Nye, PC.
Mossner Majoros & Alexander, PC.
Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz
Ronald D. Ambrose
Rudolph A. Serra
Serra and Isopi, PC.
Shaltz & Royal, PC.
Warner, Norcross & Judd
Zerrenner & Roane
Corporations
Dow Corning Corporation
Ford Motor Company
General Motors Corporation
Kellogg Company
Ronart Industries, Inc.
Organizations
American Corporate Counsel
Association, Michigan Chapter
Genesee County Bar Association
Grand Traverse-Leelanau-Antrim
Counties Bar Association
Legal Services Association
of Michigan
Legal Services of Southeastern
Michigan, Inc.
Macomb County Bar Association
Michigan Trial Lawyers Association
Oakland County Bar Association
Saginaw County Bar Association
State Bar of Michigan
Washtenaw County Bar Association
Every reader is urged to initiate steps within the firm, corporate legal depart-
ment, or organization with which he or she is associated leading to adoption of
this policy. We ask that notice of adoption be provided to the State Bar office in
Lansing (Attn: Jane Martineau); and a list will be compiled of firms and legal
departments which have taken this action.
See the December 1990 Bar Journal at page 1259 for more information.
Mexican-Americans were considered sepa-
rately from the applications of whites by a
minority admissions subcommittee, and
the file of every minority applicant was re-
viewed individually. The result was that
many minority applicants were admitted
with lower grades and LSAT scores than
white applicants who were not admitted.
78 F3d at 935-38.
17. I strongly disagree with that conclusion.
See the discussion, supra, n 11 and accom-
panying text.
18. 78 F3d at 943-49.
19. This was because the law school's efforts
to achieve diversity were limited only to
two racial-ethnic groups rather than in-
cluding all groups that could contribute to
diversity. 78 F3d at 965-66.
20. Texas v Hopwood, 116 S Ct 2581 (1996).
21. Any rejected white applicant would have
standing to challenge the constitutionality
of a racially preferential admissions pro-
gram, since that applicant would have been
treated differently because of race. It is not
necessary for standing purposes that the
white applicant show that he or she would
have been admitted if the program were
not in effect. Heckler v Mathews, 465 US
728 (1984).
22. The Supreme Court, for example, has held
the use of a reasonable and flexible racial
quota to be a constitutionally permissible
means of advancing the government's in-
terest in overcoming the present conse-
quences of identified prior discrimination
for which the government is responsible.
Fullilove v Klutznick, 448 US 448 (1980).
The Court has also upheld the power of the
federal courts to order the implementation
of a racially preferential hiring or promo-
tional plan to remedy an employer's past
discrimination in a Title VII case. See Local
28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v EEOC,
478 US 421 (1986); United States v Paradise,
480 US 149 (1987).
23. 78 F3d at 945.
24. Bakke v Regents of the University of Califor-
nia, 18 Cal 3d 34, 553 P2d 1152, 1166-67
(1976), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 438
US 265 (1978).
25. 488 US 469 (1989).
26. Some of these minority students will be
different students from those who were
admitted under the former race-conscious
admissions program-lower income and
inner city minority students as opposed to
advantaged and suburban minority stu-
dents. Likewise these factors will result
in the admission of some white students
who would have not been admitted previ-
ously-again lower income and inner city
white students, who were not given spe-
cial consideration under the race-conscious
admissions policies.
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